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On dependent conjunction and implication
Matthieu Herrmann and Alain Prouté
Abstract
In the context of our work on a new proof assistant, we were led led give a theoret-
ical model of conjunctions E ∧F and implications E ⇒ F where F is meaningful only
when E is true, a situation that is very often encountered in everyday mathematics,
and which was already considered by several type theorists. We present a version of
these concepts that is more oriented towards usual mathematics than towards type
theories, by using an extension of Lawvere’s definition of quantifiers. Also, our presen-
tation stresses the importance of proof-irrelevance and of the principle of description
in this phenomenon. We explain why this dependency is obtained through the use of a
“hidden” variable, and more generally the links of these concepts with the vernacular
language of mathematics, which is actually our main motivation. In fact, it appears
that this apparently anodine subject leads to consider several deep questions in the
foundation of mathematics. Despite its links with topos theory, this article is readable
by non-specialists.
Introduction
Conjunction, also known as the “logical and”, and widely denoted ∧, is generally defined as
a commutative operation. In other words, for any statements E and F , it is assumed (or
proved) that E ∧ F is equivalent to F ∧E.
However, there are very elementary and simple examples showing that this is not always the
case. For example, let A be a subset of the set N of the natural integers, and consider the
statement A 6= ∅ ∧ inf(A) = 0, where inf(A) denotes the infimum (greatest lower bound)
of A. This statement is clearly meaningful, should it be true or not. On the contrary,
the statement inf(A) = 0 ∧ A 6= ∅ is meaningless, because inf(A) is not well defined if we
do not know that A is nonempty. Notice that A 6= ∅ ⇒ inf(A) = 0 is meaningful and
inf(A) = 0⇒ A 6= ∅ meaningless for the same reason.
It is hard to find a treatement of this problem in the literature. It seems that the first
occurrence of a theoretic analysis of this fact can be found in a series of lectures given by
P. Martin-Löf in 1980 (see [7]), within the setting of intuitionistic type theory. The idea is
mainly based on the fact that statements can be identified with sets (or types) in view of the
1
analogy between the two situations : “the element a is of type X” and “the expression p is a
proof of the statement E”, which is now widely popularized under the name of the “Curry-
Howard correspondance”, to which Martin-Löf actually also refers. Subsequent works have
appeared modelling these “dependent logical connectives”, such as T. Coquand and G. Huet
in 1986 [1] (see also M. Hyland and A. M. Pitts [4]), or D. Pavlović [8] in 1990, among others.
We turn now to a vocabulary that is more familiar to mathematicians. We propose an
explanation of dependent conjunction and implication, which is not only a modelling of them,
but also shows how much their existence is natural. It is indeed exactly as natural as the
existence of the quantifiers ∃ and ∀, simply because dependent conjunction and implication
play the same role with respect to assumptions as quantifiers with respect to declarations. It
seems to us that the best way to understand this is to use one of the most beautiful discoveries
of William Lawvere, namely his definition of quantifiers by way of adjoint increasing maps.(1)
It appears that a dependent conjunction E ∧ F (and similarly for an implication) should
be denoted (ζ ⊢ E) ∧ F if we want to be completely explicit, where ζ ⊢ E is a kind of
declaration of ζ (actually a named assumption) and where F contains free occurrences of
the variable ζ . Of course, in usual mathematics, this variable ζ is not visible, and we also
explain on the one hand how F can have such a free occurrence of ζ , and on the other hand
why ζ remains invisible (hidden) in F , and consequently not explicitly declared before E.
The content of this article holds for both intuitionistic and classical mathematics, and is
part of type theory and topos theory’s more or less explicit folklore. We hope to add some
originality in the way we have chosen to present it, and to make the subject accessible to a
wider audience.
The authors want to thank John Newsome Crossley for his careful reading, his suggestions
and many corrections in our use of the English language.
Contents
1 Prerequisites 3
2 Lawvere’s definition of the quantifiers 5
3 Dependent conjunction and implication 7
4 Comparison with ordinary conjunction and implication 10
5 From types to sets 12
6 How an invisible variable can occur free in an expression 14
7 Why a variable can be invisible 15
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1 Prerequisites
The meaning of logical connectives was historically defined in two different ways : the
“logical” one, which defines under what conditions a given statement is true (or false),
possibly using truth tables (in other words, how to compute a truth value for a statement),
and the “operational” one, which defines the meaning of logical connectives in terms of proofs.
The second manner was initiated around 1930 by the intuitionists (and also holds for classical
logic(2)) through the so-called Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation, and also by G.
Gentzen in his work on natural deduction and the sequent calculus. This operational point of
view was more recently very elegantly reformulated using the categorical concept of adjoint
functors (in the present case, adjoint increasing maps), in particular within the setting of
topos theory.
For example, (ordinary) conjunction can be defined as the right adjoint to the duplication
(diagonal) operation. In order to see this, consider two preordered sets X and Y ,(3) and two
maps f : X → Y and g : Y → X. We say that “f is left adjoint to g” (or equivalently that
“g is right adjoint to f”) if :
∀x ∈ X ∀y ∈ Y f(x) ≤ y ⇔ x ≤ g(y)
This fact is denoted f ⊣ g.(4) This definition has several elementary consequences. First
of all, the inequality x ≤ g(f(x)) is true for any x in X (just replace y by f(x) in the
above statement, and use the reflexivity of the preorder relation). Symmetrically, we have
f(g(y)) ≤ y for any y in Y . These two inequalities are known as the “unit” and the “co-unit”
of the adjunction f ⊣ g. From this and the transitivity of preorder relations we can deduce
that f and g are increasing functions, and that if we have f ⊣ g and f ⊣ h, then g and h
are “equivalent” in the sense that for any y in Y , we have g(y) ≤ h(y) and h(y) ≤ g(y) (so
that they are actually equal if the preorder on X is an order). Of course we also have the
symmetric fact that f ⊣ h and g ⊣ h entail that f and g are equivalent (in the same sense).
Furthermore, if f ⊣ h and g ⊣ k, and if g ◦ f is meaningful, then h ◦ k is also meaningful and
we have g ◦ f ⊣ h ◦ k. Finally, we shall also need the fact that left adjoints commute (up to
equivalence) with least upper bounds, and that right adjoints commute (up to equivalence)
with greatest lower bounds.(5) We leave these facts as easy exercises for the reader.
Hence, if a map has an adjoint (either on the left or on the right), this adjoint is essentially
(i.e. up to equivalence) unique. As a consequence, if a map is defined as a left or right
adjoint to a given map, it is well defined (up to equivalence).(6) This kind of definition is a
2This is just because all intuitionistic proof principles are also valid in classical logic.
3In other words, sets with a binary relation ≤ that is reflexive and transitive.
4Warning : the symbol ⊣ is not a reversed notation for ⊢. The two symbols have completely distinct uses
(but they sometimes appear together in a single expression).
5In other words, if g : Y → X is a right adjoint and if infi∈I(yi) exists, then infi∈I(g(yi)) exists and is
equivalent to g(infi∈I(yi)).
6This does not imply that the adjoint exists. It is only “unambiguously defined (up to equivalence)” .
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particular case of a “universal problem”.
Now, consider the meta-set E of all mathematical (closed) statements. This meta-set is
preordered by the relation of deductibility, that we denote by ≤ in this article. In other
words, E ≤ F means that F can be deduced from E (i.e. proved under hypothesis E). This
is clearly a preorder.(7) For any preordered set X, the product set X ×X is also preordered
by the relation defined by the condition that (x, y) ≤ (u, v) if and only if x ≤ u and y ≤ v,
and we have a “diagonal” (or “duplication”) map ∆ : X → X ×X defined by ∆(x) = (x, x)
(which is obviously increasing).
Now, we can define a map ∧ : E × E → E just by postulating that ∆ ⊣ ∧. The map ∧ is
well defined (up to provable equivalence of statements). It is easy to recognize that this map
cannot be anything other than our usual conjunction. This is just a consequence of the fact
that the usual conjunction indeed has the property ∆ ⊣ ∧, since we have :
E ≤ F ∧G iff E ≤ F and E ≤ G iff ∆(E) = (E,E) ≤ (F,G)
This definition (which is well known in topos theory) of conjunction is one of the last known
avatars of the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation (concerning conjunction). It is
undoubtebly the most elegant thing we can do for defining (ordinary) conjunction.
Why is such a definition “operational” ? This is just because all the proof rules concerning
conjunction can be deduced from it, which is not the case if conjunction is defined by the
“logical” method, i.e. in terms of truth values. Indeed, the adjunction ∆ ⊣ ∧ means that
E ≤ F ∧ G if and only if E ≤ F and E ≤ G, in other words that it is equivalent to prove
F ∧G under the hypothesis E, or to prove separately F and G under the same hypothesis.
This is of course a rule that anyone uses everyday when a conjunction must be proved. Now,
consider the co-unit of the adjunction, which gives :
(E ∧ F,E ∧ F ) = ∆(E ∧ F ) ≤ (E,F )
and which gives the rules E ∧ F ≤ E and E ∧ F ≤ F (which are generally taken as axioms
in most presentations of the properties of conjunction). The reader is urged to check that
similarly we have ∨ ⊣ ∆, and that the principle of “reasoning by disjunction of cases” is
actually a consequence of this definition.(8)
Actually, E ∧ F is nothing other than the greatest lower bound of E and F , as is the case
of any concept defined as the right adjoint of a diagonal map (as for example gcd using the
divisibility relation, or intersection using the inclusion of subsets relation). However, the
notion of adjoint maps is much more general than the notion of greatest lower bound. Of
course, commutativity of the (ordinary) conjunction is a consequence of the commutativity
of the diagonal ∆.
7But not an order, because we are very careful not to confuse statements (that are “signifiers”, a syntactic
notion) with truth values (the corresponding “signified”, a semantic notion).
8It should be remarqued that there is no dependent disjunction in mathematics. Indeed, a disjunction
E ∨ F should be true if E is false and F true. But in this case, F cannot depend on the truth of E.
4
Because we shall use it in another section below, we also recall the definition of the usual
implication via adjunctions. Given a statement F , we consider the map E 7→ E ∧ F from E
to E . By definition, the map G 7→ F ⇒ G is a right adjoint to the previous one. In other
words, we have :
E ∧ F ≤ G iff E ≤ F ⇒ G
This means that in order to prove the implication F ⇒ G under the hypothesis E it is
enough to prove G under the hypothesis E ∧ F . This is of course what everyone does when
an implication must be proved, and is known as the “auxiliary hypothesis method”.(9)
The co-unit of this adjunction gives :
(E ⇒ F ) ∧E ≤ F
which is the principle known as “modus ponens”.
Another advantage of this method, is that it gives a clear and exciting definition of the
quantifiers, as was revealed by Lawvere.
2 Lawvere’s definition of the quantifiers
In order to express Lawvere’s definition of the quantifiers, we must first discuss the notion
of “context”. In mathematical texts, it is often the case that we “declare” variables. For
example, we can say “Let x be a real number.”. Such a sentence is called a “declaration”. In
this article, a “generic” declaration will be denoted (x ∈ X), where x is a symbol and where
X is a set.
Within any part of a mathematical text, we are “working in a context”, which is just the
consequence of the declarations made so far.(10) Let Γ denote an arbitrary context, and let
Γ(x ∈ X) denote the context obtained by declaring x as an element of X in the context Γ.
In other words, Γ(x ∈ X) is the context obtained by “enriching” Γ by a new declaration.(11)
We require that a variable cannot be declared twice in the same context. In other words,
the context Γ(x ∈ X) is invalid if x is already declared in Γ.
We also denote by EΓ the meta-set of all statements that are meaningful in the context
Γ, in other words, the free variables of which are declared in Γ. This meta-set EΓ is still
preordered by the deductibility relation, that we denote ≤Γ. There is a canonical inclusion
9Purists will argue that the method consists in considering F as an extra hypothesis, not to replace the
hypothesis E by the hypothesis E ∧F . They are right. Passing from one point of view to the other one can
of course be formalized, and we will need to do it in section 3. For the time being, we need to present these
concepts as we do, because otherwise adjunctions are not as simply applicable.
10And the “scope” of which we have not yet left.
11Formally, contexts are generated by the two rules : there is an “empty” context, and for any context Γ,
Γ(x ∈ X) is a context.
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Jx∈X : EΓ → EΓ(x∈X), since if a free variable in a statement E is declared in Γ, it is a fortiori
declared in Γ(x ∈ X). Notice the importance of the fact that a variable cannot be declared
twice in the same context. Indeed, if a variable x is already declared as an element of some set
Y in Γ, it can be the case that a statement E which is meaningful in Γ becomes meaningless
in Γ(x ∈ X). This phenomenon is analogous to the well known “variable capture”.
Since Jx∈X is a canonical inclusion, any statement E is identical to Jx∈X(E) from a syntactic
point of view. However, it is in many places very important to still see this operator Jx∈X .
This is why, instead of writing Jx∈X(E) as E, we write it in grey : Jx∈X(E).
Now, if a is any expression representing an element of X in the context Γ, and if E ∈ EΓ(x∈X),
the process of replacing all (free) occurrences of x in E by the expression a produces a
statement interpretable (i.e. meaningful) in the context Γ, in other words, an element
of EΓ, that we denote by E[a/x] (read “E where a replaces x”). Hence, we have a map
[a/x] : EΓ(x∈X) → EΓ (for each such a), and it is clear that this map is a retraction for
Jx∈X (i.e. that [a/x] ◦ Jx∈X = 1EΓ). Furthermore, this map is increasing (in other words,
if E ≤Γ(x∈X) F , then E[a/x] ≤Γ F [a/x]) because the replacement can also be performed
within proofs.(12)
Lawvere defines the quantifiers by postulating that :(13)(14)
∃x∈X ⊣ Jx∈X ⊣ ∀x∈X
Let us check that our “usual” quantifiers have this property, so that they are actually equiv-
alent to Lawvere’s quantifiers. In the case of the universal quantifier, Lawvere’s definition
writes :
Jx∈X(E) ≤Γ(x∈X) F iff E ≤Γ ∀x∈X F
12We do not give any precise definition of the replacement. We assume only that it is a retraction for Jx∈X
and that it is increasing. These two properties are of course easy consequences of the “usual” definition of
the replacement, and of the definition of proofs (that we do not explicitly need here).
Important warning : The inclusion Jx∈X : EΓ → EΓ(x∈T ) allows to identify EΓ to a subset of EΓ(x∈X), but
not as a preordered subset. Indeed, we can have Jx∈X(E) ≤Γ(x∈X) Jx∈X(F ), and not have E ≤Γ F , because
the fact of declaring x in X can allow to prove things which are not provable in the context Γ. Think for
example of what happens if you declare an element in the empty set.
13Maybe the word “defines” needs an explanation. The reality is that such adjunctions can be used
to define the deductibility relation itself, and this provides a meaning for the logical connectives as a by-
product. See [10] Chapitre 1, for a detailed explanation of this fact. Lawvere did not actually give the
definition exactly in this form. His “definition” (or more accurately, his characterization) looks much more
in the form of a pair of internal (in the sens of the “internal logic” of topos theory) adjoints to the “inverse
image” arrow P(Y ) → P(X) (for a given arrow X → Y ), where P(X) and P(Y ) are seen as “internally
ordered objects”. There is also an “external” version of this using Sub (the subobject functor) instead of
P (the power object functor). In some sens, Lawvere’s actual definition uses subsets where we are using
statements, but this is of course equivalent in view of the one-to-one correspondance between subobjects (or
subsets) and characteristic arrows. See Lawvere [6].
14Writing the declaration after a quantifier as subparts is not usual practice. However, we want to stress
the fact that the declaration x ∈ X plays the role of a parameter for the function E 7→ ∀x∈X E. This is also
coherent with the notation Jx∈X .
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What this says is that in order to prove ∀x∈X F under the hypothesis E, we can just declare
x in X and prove F under this same hypothesis E (and that the converse is also true). This
is clearly what we do everyday.
The co-unit of the adjunction writes :
Jx∈X(∀x∈X F ) ≤Γ(x∈X) F
which is the most general case of particularization of a universally quantified statement. It
says that if ∀x∈X F is true, then F is true, provided of course that we interpert this in the
context Γ(x ∈ X) (otherwise, F would anyway be meaningless). Applying the replacement
map [a/x] to both sides, we get :
∀x∈X F ≤Γ F [a/x]
which is the “usual” particularization principle.
A symmetric analysis can be done for the existential quantifier. Precisely, the adjunction
writes :
∃x∈X E ≤Γ F iff E ≤Γ(x∈X) Jx∈X(F )
This shows how to use an existence hypothesis. Indeed, in order to prove F under the
hypothesis ∃x∈X E, we can first declare x ∈ X, and then prove F under the hypothesis E.
This is again what everybody does instinctively. Applying the replacement [a/x] to the unit
of the adjunction yields :
E[a/x] ≤Γ ∃x∈X E
which is the usual “exhibition principle” used for proving an existence.
3 Dependent conjunction and implication
We now arrive at the heart of our subject. Contexts are constructed not only via declara-
tions, but also via “assumptions”. For example, we can find the following sentence within a
mathematical text : “Let x be a real number, and assume that x > 0.”, i.e. a declaration
followed by an assumption. Obviously, both are modifying the context in the intuitive sense,
simply because they both provide new means for proving.
Let’s use the notation ζ ⊢ E (read “ζ proves E ”) for a generic assumption, where E is a
statement, and ζ the “name” of the assumption. As previously with declarations, we consider
contexts of the form Γ(ζ ⊢ E) obtained by enriching Γ by the “assumption” ζ ⊢ E,(15) and
we have a canonical inclusion Jζ ⊢E : EΓ → EΓ(ζ ⊢E).(
16)
15Declarations and assumptions can be mixed in a single context.
16In general, assumptions are anonymous : “Assume E.”, but can also be named such as in : “Assume E
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Imitating Lawvere, we introduce, for any statement E, two “declarative operators”,
F 7→ (ζ ⊢ E) ∧ F and F 7→ (ζ ⊢ E)⇒ F
which are actually two maps from EΓ(ζ ⊢E) to EΓ, by postulating :
(ζ ⊢ E)∧ ⊣ Jζ ⊢E ⊣ (ζ ⊢ E)⇒
Before proving anything from this definition, we must capture the fact that E is true in the
context Γ(ζ ⊢ E) (and even a little more than this). Nothing up to here can entail this
fact, because there is a priori no link between the deductibility relation and the concept
represented by the sign ⊢, which actually has no precise meaning up to now, and is mainly
just a syntactic gadget. In other words, we must state a principle that establishes the link
between “deductibility” and “assumption”. We propose the following special rule :
E ∧ F ≤Γ G iff Jζ ⊢E(F ) ≤Γ(ζ ⊢E) Jζ ⊢E(G)
(where ∧ is ordinary conjunction) which says that it is the same thing to deduce G from
E ∧F or to deduce G from F alone after having assumed E. It is actually the formalisation
of the difference refered to in footnote 9.(17)
Now, let us examine the consequences of the above definition. Concerning the right adjoint
(the “dependent implication”) we have the equivalence :
Jζ ⊢E(F ) ≤Γ(ζ ⊢E) G iff F ≤Γ (ζ ⊢ E)⇒ G
This means that proving the implication (ζ ⊢ E) ⇒ G under the hypothesis F is the same
as proving G under the same hypothesis F , but after having assumed E. This is clearly
the same thing as the usual “auxiliary hypothesis method”,(18) and this just shows that this
method is compatible with the dependency of G on the truth of E.
(ζ).”, where ζ is a symbol (a name, but in practice, a number is generally used) by which we can later refer to
this assumption. The reason why assumptions are generally anonymous is a consequence of a fundamental
principle of mathematics, called “proof-irrelevance”, which is discussed in section 7. For our explanations,
we need to be explicit, hence the notation ζ ⊢ E. Furthermore, if p is any proof of E in the context Γ, the
replacement operation [p/ζ] : EΓ(ζ ⊢E) → EΓ is a retraction for Jζ ⊢E and is increasing. In this article, we
do not give any precise definition of the notion of proof. This is not necessary for our purpose, and we will
actually not use this kind of replacement.
17A similar rule exists in Gentzen’s work (left ∧-rule), which establishes the link between the conjunction
and the coma in the left members of sequents. This coma may be considered as an external version of the
conjunction, and indeed, concatanation of assumptions in a context is also a kind of “external” conjunction.
From this special rule, we can derive the rule : H ≤Γ(ζ ⊢E) Jζ ⊢E(E) for any statement E meaningful in Γ
and any statement H meaningful in Γ(ζ ⊢ E). Indeed, it is enough to replace F by ⊤ (a greatest element in
EΓ), and G by E in the special rule, and to use the facts that E∧⊤ ≃ E and that H ≤Γ(ζ ⊢E) ⊤ ≃ Jζ ⊢E(⊤),
because indeed, Jζ ⊢E , as a right adjoint, preserves greatest elements which are the greatest lower bounds of
the empty subset. This derived rule just says that if you assume E, then E is true.
18And here, we are much closer to the usual meaning of this method than in the introduction. See
footnote 9.
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Notice that the co-unit of this adjunction says :
Jζ ⊢E((ζ ⊢ E)⇒ G) ≤Γ(ζ ⊢E) G
which means that if you have the hypothesis (ζ ⊢ E)⇒ G in a context where E is assumed,
you can deduce G. This is the most general dependent version of “modus ponens”. There is
no hope to have exactly the form (E ⇒ G) ∧ E ≤ G because the left hand side should be
interpretable in a context not declaring ζ , where G is not meaningful (because it depends
on ζ).(19) However, we have the following inequality :(20)
Jζ ⊢E((ζ ⊢ E) ∧ Jζ ⊢E((ζ ⊢ E)⇒ G)) ≤Γ(ζ ⊢E) G
Indeed, we first have (ζ ⊢ E)∧Jζ ⊢E((ζ ⊢ E)⇒ G) ≤Γ (ζ ⊢ E)⇒ G, by the co-unit of the
adjunction (ζ ⊢ E)∧ ⊣ Jζ ⊢E , and since Jζ ⊢E is increasing, we have :
Jζ ⊢E((ζ ⊢ E) ∧ Jζ ⊢E((ζ ⊢ E)⇒ G)) ≤Γ(ζ ⊢E) Jζ ⊢E((ζ ⊢ E)⇒ G)
Now, we also have Jζ ⊢E((ζ ⊢ E) ⇒ G) ≤Γ(ζ ⊢E) G, by the co-unit of the other adjunction.
We shall show in section 4 that (ζ ⊢ E)∧Jζ ⊢E((ζ ⊢ E)⇒ G) is equivalent to E∧((ζ ⊢ E)⇒
G) (where ∧ is ordinary conjunction), so that we also have the simplified form :
Jζ ⊢E(E ∧ ((ζ ⊢ E)⇒ G)) ≤Γ(ζ ⊢E) G
which is probably the formulation that is the closest possible to ordinary modus ponens.
Concerning the left adjoint (“dependent conjunction”) we have the equivalence :
(ζ ⊢ E) ∧ F ≤Γ G iff F ≤Γ(ζ ⊢E) Jζ ⊢E(G)
which means that in order to use the hypothesis (ζ ⊢ E) ∧ F in order to prove G, we can
just use only the hypothesis F , but after having assumed E. This is again indeed what we
do daily in a natural and instinctive way.(21)
The unit of this adjunction says :
F ≤Γ(ζ ⊢E) Jζ ⊢E((ζ ⊢ E) ∧ F )
which means that (ζ ⊢ E) ∧ F can be deduced from F , provided that E is assumed, which
is again an everyday proof method (actually, the canonical way for proving a dependent
conjunction).
19However, if we have a proof p of E in the context Γ, applying [p/ζ] to both sides, we get (ζ ⊢ E) ⇒
G ≤Γ G[p/ζ], which looks like another variation on modus ponens.
20This inequality was suggested to us by Paul-André Melliès during a talk on this subject. Actually, this
is a particular case of the fact that if F , G and H are functors such that F ⊣ G ⊣ H , then we have the
natural transformation ε◦GεH from GFGH to the identity functor (where the two ε are the co-units of the
two adjunctions).
21Notice the similarity between this equivalence and the special rule. In some sense, the special rule says
that the ordinary conjunction also has this property.
9
Notice that the non dependent counterpart of this last fact is just the fact that in order to
prove E∧F under some hypothesis, we can prove E and then F under the same hypothesis.
In the dependent situation this works similarly except that E must be proved first, because
the fact that E is true is necessary to make F meaningful.
4 Comparison with ordinary conjunction and implica-
tion
A natural question is that of the equivalence of (ζ ⊢ E)∧Jζ ⊢E(F ) and ordinary conjunction
E ∧ F , and similarly for implication. Here, F is meaningful in the same context as E, so
that Jζ ⊢E(F ) does not “actually depend” on the truth of E.(
22)
In order to avoid any confusion, we recall that a dependent conjunction is always denoted
(ζ ⊢ E) ∧ F even if F does not actually depend on the truth of E (i.e., even if F is in the
image of Jζ ⊢E). On the contrary, of course, ordinary conjunction is denoted E ∧ F . The
same rule applies to the two kinds of implication.
For conjunction, we have successively :
E ∧ F ≤Γ E ∧ F reflexivity
Jζ ⊢E(F ) ≤Γ(ζ ⊢E) Jζ ⊢E(E ∧ F ) (special rule)
(ζ ⊢ E) ∧ Jζ ⊢E(F ) ≤Γ E ∧ F ((ζ ⊢ E)∧ ⊣ Jζ ⊢E)
For the converse inequality, we have :
Jζ ⊢E(F ) ≤Γ(ζ ⊢E) Jζ ⊢E((ζ ⊢ E) ∧ Jζ ⊢E(F ))) (unit of the adjunction)
E ∧ F ≤Γ (ζ ⊢ E) ∧ Jζ ⊢E(F ) (special rule)
For implication, we have successively :
(E ⇒ F ) ∧ E ≤Γ F (modus ponens)
Jζ ⊢E(E ⇒ F ) ≤Γ(ζ ⊢E) Jζ ⊢E(F ) (special rule)
E ⇒ F ≤Γ (ζ ⊢ E)⇒ Jζ ⊢E(F ) (Jζ ⊢E ⊣ (ζ ⊢ E)⇒)
and for the converse inequality :
Jζ ⊢E((ζ ⊢ E)⇒ Jζ ⊢E(F )) ≤Γ(ζ ⊢E) Jζ ⊢E(F ) (co-unit of the adjunction)
((ζ ⊢ E)⇒ Jζ ⊢E(F )) ∧ E ≤Γ F (special rule)
(ζ ⊢ E)⇒ Jζ ⊢E(F ) ≤Γ E ⇒ F (A 7→ A ∧ E ⊣ F 7→ E ⇒ F )
22Be careful not to confuse the notion of “non-dependent” which applies to ordinary conjunction and
implication, and the notion of “not actually dependent”, which applies to dependent conjunctions and
implications of the forms (ζ ⊢ E) ∧ Jζ ⊢E(F ) and (ζ ⊢ E)⇒ Jζ ⊢E(F ).
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Hence, the dependent conjunction and implication are equivalent to ordinary conjunction
and implication when their second operand does not “actually depend” on the truth of the
first one. This is of course an important and reassuring fact.
Possibly surprising may be the fact that usual conjunction comes as a right adjoint (and
consequently is a “multiplicative” connective), whereas dependent conjunction comes as a
left adjoint (and hence is an “additive” connective). In other words, the meaning of the usual
conjunction is defined in terms of its behaviour when it is in the position of the conclusion,
whereas the meaning of dependent conjunction is defined in terms of its behaviour when it
is in the position of the hypothesis, as we saw above. A fact which can demystify this point
for the reader is the similar fact that an indexed disjoint union of sets, such as
∐
x∈X
Y
(a notion of an additive nature, which can actually be defined through the use of a left
adjoint) can be identified with the cartesian product X × Y (a notion of a multiplicative
nature) when Y does not actually depend on x, which is after all just a more elaborate
example than 2 + 2 + 2 = 3× 2.
However, we can temper the mysterious aspect of this by remarking that ordinary conjunction
as a right adjoint is a binary operation, whereas dependant conjunction is in no way a binary
operation. It looks much like a declarative operation, i.e. it constructs expressions containing
a declaration and a “body” which is the scope of this declaration. There are many such
declarative operations in mathematics, for example :
∀x∈X E {x ∈ X | E} (x ∈ X) 7→ E
∐
x∈X
E etc . . .
(where E is the body). So, the dependent conjunction is a quite different operation from ordi-
nary conjunction. In a conclusion, we may be troubled by the fact that the two conjunctions
have the same name (which is nevertheless justified by what we proved above).
The fact that conjunction should preferably be considered as a left adjoint (or an additive
connective) rather than a right adjoint (or a multiplicative connective) could have been
(but actually was not) suggested in the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, the
Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation, which is a definition of the meaning of the
logical connectives in terms of proofs, says that :(23)
• a proof of E ∧ F is a pair (p, q) where p is a proof of E and q a proof of F ,
• a proof of E ∨F is a pair (i, p) where i is either 0 or 1, and p a proof of E if i = 0 and
a proof of F if i = 1,
23For a discussion of this interpertation stressing the fact that it hides a confusion between the signifier
and the signified, see [10], pages 25-26. This confusion disappears if one replaces “proof” by “warrantor”;
see section 7.
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• a proof of E ⇒ F is a method(24) for producing a proof of F from a proof of E,
• a proof of ∀x∈X E is a method for producing a proof of E from any x in X,
• a proof of ∃x∈X E is a pair (x, p) where x is an element of X, and p a proof of E.
As one can see, additive connectives are those for which a proof is a pair, whereas multi-
plicative connectives are those for which a proof is a method, provided that the conjunction
is considered as an additive connective. However, it should be remarked that pairs which are
proofs of E ∨ F and ∃x∈X E are clearly “dependent pairs”, in the sense that the statement
proved by the second component of the pair depends on the value of the first component,
and it is certain that, despite the fact that they were necessarily aware of this dependency,
the early intuitionists always considered pairs that are proofs of a conjunction as “ordinary
pairs”. In the work of Gentzen, there is also no mention of a dependent conjunction. The
reason for this could be that for some reason, these mathematicians were not much concerned
by the principle of description (see section 6), or equivalently, but maybe more accurately,
that they did not take into account in their models of reasoning the fact that the definition
of a mathematical object can depend on the truth of a statement.
5 From types to sets
The definition given in section 3 of dependent conjunction and implication provides a clear
explanation of another phenomenon that we now consider.
The authors of this article were working on a compiler for a typed system similar to those
familiar to topos theorists, such as the type theory one can find in Lambek and Scott [5],
but with a type constructor W (taking a statement as its unique operand) with the meaning
that data of typeW (E) are “warrantors” of E, i.e. objects that “warrant” the truth of E.(25)
At the “low level” of this system, the declaration following a quantifier has the form x : T
where T is a type (not a set !), and where the symbol : plays a role similar to ∈, but means
“is of type” instead of “belongs to”. In this system, sets are defined as data whose type has
the form P(T ), where the type constructor P is of course a syntactic version of the power
object functor of topos theory. More precisely, a datum of type P(T ) is called a “set hosted
by T ”. We also say that T is the “host” of X.
At the “high level” of the system, types are invisible and only sets are manipulated. In
particular, the quantifiers have the form ∀x∈X E and ∃x∈X E where X is a set (not a type !).
The compiler of the system must translate this high level formulation into a low level one.
The formulas for this transformation are :
∀x∈X E := ∀x:T (x ∈ X ⇒ E)
∃x∈X E := ∃x:T (x ∈ X ∧ E)
24By “method”, you can understand “algorithm”.
25More on this notion in section 7.
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where T is the host of X, and where x ∈ X in the right hand members is not a declaration
but a statement (whereas it is a “high level” declaration in the left hand members).
Why these definitions should be written like this is intuitively obvious. However, it is not
so easy to give an explanation of why they must be written like this. This can be done as
follows.
First of all, we need a definition for the high level declaration x ∈ X. It is defined as the
low level declaration x : T (where T is the host of X), accompanied by the assumption
x ∈ X.(26) In other words, the high level context enrichment by (x ∈ X) must be translated
into the low level “two step” context enrichment as (x : T )(ζ ⊢ x ∈ X).
Now, since the adjoint of a composition is the (reversed) composition of the adjoints, we
have :(27)
∃x:T ◦ (ζ ⊢ x ∈ X)∧ ⊣ Jζ ⊢x∈X ◦ Jx:T ⊣ ∀x:T ◦ (ζ ⊢ x ∈ X)⇒
which is just the wanted explanation.
Notice that this explanation is made possible by the fact (among other things) that dependent
conjunction is defined as a left adjoint. Also notice that in the expressions ∀x:T (x ∈ X ⇒ E)
and ∃x:T (x ∈ X ∧ E), the implication and the conjunction are obviously dependent, since
E can be meaningless if x does not belong to X.
We can apply the same method to similar situations. We give just one example. Denote by
T (T )Γ the meta-set of all terms of type T meaningful in the context Γ.(
28) The meta-set
T (P(T ))Γ of all expressions representing sets hosted by T is preordered by the relation of
inclusion, denoted ⊂.(29) We use the more precise notation ⊂Γ in order to stress the fact
that the inclusion is valid in the context Γ (which entails that both operands of ⊂Γ are
meaningful in the context Γ). We have the two “low level” maps :
EΓ(x:T )
E 7→{x:T | E}
--
T (P(T ))Γ
A 7→x∈A
mm
and similarly, two “high level” maps by replacing x : T by the declaration x ∈ X, and P(T )
by P(X). Notice that E 7→ {x : T | E} is left adjoint to A 7→ x ∈ A, since :
{x : T | E} ⊂Γ A iff E ≤Γ(x:T ) x ∈ A
and similarly for the high level maps. Now, we have :
(E 7→ {x : T | E}) ◦ ((ζ ⊢ x ∈ X)∧) ⊣ Jζ ⊢x∈X ◦ (A 7→ x ∈ A)
26This is just because X is to be considered intuitively as a “part” of T .
27Recall that the notations (ζ ⊢ x ∈ X)∧ and (ζ ⊢ x ∈ X)⇒ are abbreviations for E 7→ (ζ ⊢ x ∈ X) ∧ E
and E 7→ (ζ ⊢ x ∈ X)⇒ E.
28EΓ could be considered as the special case T (Ω)Γ, where the object Ω is the subobject classifier.
29Indeed, the sets hosted by T are ordered by inclusion, whereas the expressions which represent them
are only preordered by inclusion, since several distinct expressions can represent the same set. In logic, we
should never confuse a signifier with the corresponding signified, as we were taught by Gottlob Frege [2].
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again by the composition of adjoints. Since, Jζ ⊢x∈X(x ∈ A) can also be written x ∈ A, we
see that the high level comprehension {x ∈ X | E} must be translated at the low level into
{x : T | x ∈ X ∧ E}.
6 How an invisible variable can occur free in an ex-
pression
The declaration of ζ in (ζ ⊢ E) ∧ F and in (ζ ⊢ E) ⇒ F (30) would be useless if ζ had no
free occurrence (should it be hidden) in F . Of course, we know that in usual mathematics,
this ζ is not explicitly declared and not explicitly written in the expression F (which is why
the phenomenon is somewhat mysterious).
Returning to our example A 6= ∅ ∧ inf(A) = 0 in the introduction, we want to write it as
follows :
(ζ ⊢ A 6= ∅) ∧ inf[ζ ](A) = 0
in order to make everything explicit, and in particular the fact that inf needs ζ . The purpose
of this section is to explain how a free occurrence of ζ can be present (even if invisible) in
the statement inf(A) = 0.
In everyday mathematics, there is a principle that we apply without being in general con-
scious of the fact that it is one of the key bricks of the system. This is the “principle of
description”, which (informally) says that if you have proved the existence and uniqueness
of a mathematical object, then this object is well defined. In topos theory, this principle is a
theorem that can be stated as follows. Given two objects X and Y in a topos, and an arrow
ϕ : X × Y → Ω,(31) such that the statement of the internal language ∀x∈X ∃!y∈Y ϕ(x, y)(
32)
is true (in the empty context), then there is one and only one arrow f : X → Y such that
the statement of the internal language ∀x∈X ϕ(x, f(x)) is true.(
33) The importance of the
role played in mathematics by this principle is discussed in [9].
If we want to make everything explicit (so that mathematics look like a programming lan-
guage), we introduce a so-called “description operator”, taking as unique operand a proof(34)
p of a statement of the form ∃!x∈X E, and producing an element of X (satisfying the state-
ment E). This operator exists in every topos.(35) Notice that considering a similar operator
30ζ ⊢ E is of course a kind of declaration.
31Recall that Ω is the subobject classifier, which plays the role of an “object of truth values”, similar to
the usual set of booleans {true, false}, but possibly much more complicated than the booleans (and which is
not necessarily a set).
32Where as usual, ∃! means “there exists a unique”.
33It is easier to see this theorem as a version of the informal explanation above if you consider that X
represents a context (instead of the domain of a function), or alternatively by putting X = 1.
34Or more accurately a warrantor; see section 7.
35It is essentially the arrow denoted ♯ in [9].
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valid for any statement of the form ∃x∈X E (i.e. without the uniqueness condition) would
be equivalent to introduce something like a “Hilbert choice operator” (and this one does not
exist in every topos(36)).
Now, it is clear that the definition of the greatest lower bound of a nonempty subset of N
looks like this : “the unique integer such that . . . ”, in other word, it uses the principle of
description, or, if we want everything to be explicit, the description operator. This is how
the variable ζ has a free occurrence in inf(A), since the expression defining inf(A) necessarily
has a subterm of the form δ(p) (where δ is the description operator), where p is a proof of a
statement of the form ∃!x:T E, and has at least one free occurrence of ζ , since it must use ζ
as an hypothesis.
In the next section, we explain why all those things are invisible.
7 Why a variable can be invisible
Proof-irrelevance has important consequences for understanding the usual language of math-
ematics, the so-called “vernacular” of mathematics. It explains why assumptions are most
often anonymous, why a mathematician can use a theorem without reading a proof of it, why
proofs can be written in a somewhat lazy way, in contrast with statements and terms,(37)
why some formal proof constructors have no counterpart in the everyday language of math-
ematics, and also why the variable ζ in the dependent conjunction (ζ ⊢ E) ∧ F and the
dependent implication (ζ ⊢ E)⇒ F is invisible.
Proofs are a syntactic concept, i.e. they are expressions of a language, so that they are
candidates to be “signifiers”. As any signifier they have a corresponding signified. We call
such a signified a “warrantor”. But be careful, a warrantor is not just an equivalence class of
proofs. The notion of warrantor can be precisely defined in topos theory,(38) and it can be
the case that a given warrantor is represented by no proof at all.(39) However, a warrantor of
a statement E always warrants that E is true (hence its name). Proof-irrelevance is then a
consequence of the principle of “the uniqueness of the warrantor”, i.e. the fact that a given
36A topos satisfies the “external axiom of choice” if all its objects are projective. This is stronger than the
“internal axiom of choice” which says that the axiom of choice is true as a statement of the internal language.
A Hilbert choice operator is even stronger than the external axiom of choice because it amounts to choose
a section for every epimorphism. Actually, the original Hilbert choice operator ε applied to statements and
was such that ε(∃x∈X E) was well defined even if there is no x such that E. This allowed Hilbert to define
the meaning of ∃x∈X E as that of E[ε(∃x∈X E)/x]. This is why we say “something like the Hilbert choice
operator”. For the original Hilbert’s work, see [3]
37Terms are those expressions representing mathematical objects in the usual sense.
38A statement E meaningful in a context Γ is interpreted as an arrow ⌊E⌋Γ from Γ (the object representing
Γ) to Ω. A warrantor of E is just a section of the pullback of ⊤ : 1 → Ω along ⌊E⌋Γ. This notion was
introduced by the second author around 2007 in [11].
39Which just means that in the given topos we have a true statement which is not (internally) provable.
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statement cannot have more than one warrantor (which is actually an easy consequence of
its topos theoretic definition).
We now use a metaphor. Imagine that you are alone on a desert island. Do you think
that you need a name ? For sure, you do not. You are just “the one on the island”(40) (of
course, we know which island (which plays here the role of the statement) we are talking
about). Similarly, a warrantor of a statement E, does not need any name. You can call it
“the warrantor of E” (assuming that it exists, of course). So, what matters is not “who is a
warrantor of E ?”, but only “is there a warrantor of E ?”.
This is of course why assumptions are most often anonymous, because, as explained above,
an assumption is nothing other than the declaration of a warrantor. If we have a named
hypothesis such as “Assume E (ζ).” in a text, it is of course very handy to refer to it by its
name ζ (that in general is just a number), but it is by no means required, because in the
scope of this assumption, ζ is the name of the unique warrantor of E, who does not need
any name because it is unique. There is even no need to refer to it in general. Remark that
if we had the funny idea of assuming the same statement E twice with distinct names ζ and
η, it would be quite ridiculous to refer preferably to ζ instead of η. Do you think that one
of these two hypotheses could be better than the other one for any (strictly mathematical)
purpose ?
Similarly, a theorem can be anonymous (even if it is usual to give it the name of a person
who found a proof of it for the first time). When a mathematician uses a theorem proved
in another article or book, he does not need to specify that in order to be suitable for the
purpose of his own proof, it must have been proved in one way rather than in another. The
only thing that matters is that the theorem was reliably proved at least once. Also remark
that if a mathematician finds a better proof of an already proved statement (better because
shorter, more conceptual, using better tools, and so on. . . ) the theorem keeps the name
of the original mathematician. In a sense, the name is not attributed with respect to the
quality of the proof given, but only according to anteriority, that is to the insurance that
the warrantor exists. Formally, the name is given to the warrantor, not to the proof.
It is a fact that proofs can be written in a lazy way, or more precisely that we do not write
the proof of a theorem in the same way depending on the audience. If you write a proof
for undergraduate students, you will put more details than if you write it for researchers.
This just means of course that researchers have a better ability to find out the missing (or
implicit) parts of the proof. In both cases, it does not matter how people fill theses gaps,
provided that they fill them. This is again just because of the uniqueness of the warrantor.
Furthermore, proofs are so lazily written in general that some necessary (formal) constructs
are always omitted. In other words, these constructs have no equivalent in the vernacular.
As an example, assume that p is a proof of an implication E ⇒ F (in any context), and
40Some would argue that this expression also is a “name”. However, this kind of name could not be used
for differentiating two people on the island.
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that q is a proof of E (in the same context). Formally, a proof of F is then the applicative
term p(q) (or something similar, in any case, a kind of “modus ponens operator” applied
to p and q). There is nothing in the vernacular that corresponds to this p(q). We content
ourself with the fact that E and E ⇒ F having become “obvious” at some point of the
discourse, F is also obvious at this point. This is of course possible because we do not have
to be precise on how we prove this fact, which is again a consequence of the uniqueness of
the warrantor. There is a mental mecanism corresponding to the possibility of “applying” p
to q, but nothing to writing it down. There are several other example of this phenomenon,
and almost half of the formal proof language constructs (that we do not need to describe
here) is concerned.
The above arguments are actually symptoms of the fact that proof-irrelevance is at work
in mathematics. They are not an explanation of the necessity of this principle. We do not
pretend that the argument we are now giving is the explanation, but it is nevertheless the
most explanatory we have at hand, despite the fact that we are conscious that our argument
is still disputable.
First of all, it is necessary that the reader accepts that the vernacular language of mathemat-
ics is a strongly typed language. This seems to be in contradiction with Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory, but actually there is no contradiction because Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory is not
a formalization of the language of mathematics, but only some way of coding mathematical
objects into the sole notion of set. The simple fact that a declaration such as “Let X.” is
unacceptable (because the reader will for sure ask What is X ?), shows that mathematical
objects have a type and are not only nude sets as Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory could let
us think.(41) Furthermore, almost all mathematical symbols are polysemic (in other words,
they have several different meanings), and the only tool we have for resolving the ambigui-
ties created by polysemy is to use the types of objects. Notice that these types are mainly
generated by the fact that we give a name to each new concept we define.
That said, a picture of mathematics can be that of a four levels system, where the levels
contain respectively types, (mathematical) objects, statements and warrantors. The Curry-
Howard correspondance just says that the pair (types,objects) has essentially the same be-
haviour as the pair (statements,warrantors), and the purpose of this discussion is to explain
why statements have at most one warrantor, unlike types that can have several distinct
elements.
As is well known in topos theory, any statement can be rewritten in the form of an equality
whose left and right hand members contain no statement at all. As a consequence, the unique
purpose of proofs is to prove equalities between objects of the same type.(42) Now, if it is
the case that we need to make a distinction between two warrantors of the same statement,
we would need a tool for ensuring equality (or non equality) between warrantors. This tool
41Remark that we also often write “Let X be a set.”, which show that sets are only particular objects
among many others.
42An equality between two objects of distinct types (such as a matrix and a polynomial) is meaningless.
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could not be anything other than another notion of proof, because warrantors would be at
least as complicated and undecidable as mathematical objects. But that way, we are clearly
entering into an infinite regression, which is unacceptable. In other words, it is our opinion
that proof-irrelevance is a mandatory foundational principle.
Summarizing, warrantors are generally omitted in notations, and the context provides the
insurance that they exist, which is enough. As a consequence, the notation inf(A) for the
greatest lower bound of A makes no reference to a warrantor (or proof) of the fact that A
is nonempty, so that the name ζ of the required warrantor does not appear in the notation.
Since it does not appear in the notation inf(A), it is also useless to declare it in front of
A 6= ∅. This is why, dependent conjunction and implication are written E ∧ F and E ⇒ F
in the vernacular and not (ζ ⊢ E) ∧ F and (ζ ⊢ E) ⇒ F . But they remain nevertheless
dependent.
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